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1. Introduction
Over the last two decades, a number of countries have deregulated their
electricity industry in order to create competitive electricity markets. These
markets have different methodologies to handle transmission congestion. The
US and some other countries use nodal pricing while Europe and Australia
have favored zonal pricing. Nodal pricing explicitly considers the transmis-
sion constraints and all accepted bids are paid with the local price in the
node where the participant is located. Zonal pricing is an approximation
of the nodal pricing regime, see Bjørndal et al. (2003). It aggregates spe-
cific nodes in order to create zones with uniform prices. Compared to nodal
pricing, the zonal approximation would normally lead to a less efficient day-
ahead dispatch. On the other hand, it could be argued that zonal pricing
simplifies clearing of the day-ahead market and that it facilitates hedging
and intra-day trading. Moreover, market participants, especially consumers,
often favor zonal pricing.
In Europe, the zonal market is settled in two stages. We consider the
version of the zonal market where all stages are market based, as in UK and
the Nordic countries. The first settlement is the day-ahead market. In the
economic dispatch related to the day-ahead market, each zone is assumed
to be a copper plate and only transmission constraints between zones are
considered. The second settlement is the real-time market, where all trans-
mission constraints are fully represented in the economic dispatch problem.
The simplified representation of transmission constraints in the day-ahead
market may cause overloading of some of the transmission lines. This is
relieved by counter-trading in the real-time market, the system operator ac-
cepts bids which reduce the production in the export constrained nodes and
accepts bids which increase the production in the import constrained nodes.
Different representations of the transmission constraints in the two stages
result in different prices in the two stages. This gives producers an arbitrage
opportunity. Harvey and Hogan (2000a) and Harvey and Hogan (2000b)
show that a producer in an export constrained node can increase its profit
by selling more in the day-ahead market and then buy back power at a lower
price in the real-time market. This kind of bidding behaviour is referred
to as the increase-decrease (inc-dec) game. As explained by Alaywan et al.
(2004) this game contributed to the electricity crisis in California and to that
California and other markets in US switched from zonal to nodal pricing.
According to Neuhoff et al. (2011), there are also problems with the inc-dec
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game in the British electricity market. In this paper, we use simulations to
quantify inefficiencies and other problems related with zonal pricing. We also
show how these problems can be mitigated by a change in the design of the
real-time market.
Several researchers have analyzed the zonally-priced electricity markets.
Green (2007), Bjørndal and Jo¨rnsten (2007) and Bjørndal et al. (2012) ap-
proximate the two stages by a one-stage game. Ruderer and Zo¨ttl (2012) con-
sider a regulated (non-market based) redispatch without the inc-dec game,
as in the German electricity market. Holmberg and Lazarczyk (2015) study
the strategic bidding under nodal, zonal and discriminatory pricing and con-
cludes that even if the optimal dispatch of the generators are the same in
all pricing approaches, the inc-dec game results in extra profit for the gen-
erators located at the export-constrained nodes. Holmberg and Lazarczyk
(2015) disregard imperfect competition and focus on imperfections caused
by arbitrage opportunities. Dijk and Willems (2011) consider both imper-
fect competition and arbitrage opportunities but their analysis is limited to
two-node networks. They also show that the extra profit for export con-
strained producers distorts the investment signals and that this causes a
long-run social welfare loss.
This paper contributes by studying oligopolistic competition of genera-
tors in zonally-priced electricity markets with multiple nodes. We assume
that each producer chooses a bid price for its plant1 and we consider three
different methods to set prices in the real-time market: (1) pay-as-bid pric-
ing as in Britain, (2) optimal zonal pricing and (3) a hybrid approach that
approximates the Nordic market design. Optimal zonal pricing means that
all constraints of the network are considered by the real-time market, but we
add a set of extra constraints which require that the clearing price must be
the same for all nodes within a zone. This is related to flow-based market
coupling, which the European Union advocates for day-ahead markets, see
Van den Bergh et al. (2016). Bjørndal et al. (2012) use optimal zonal pricing
in order to approximate day-ahead markets. One of our contributions is that
we evaluate how optimal zonal pricing works in the real-time market. This
introduces an extra constraint in the real-time market, which normally makes
1In this paper, we consider a price-bid/Bertrand game. However, in principle our
approach can be extended to the Cournot game (quantity-bid game) or price-quantity-bid
game.
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the design inefficient. On the other hand, this constraint also reduces price
differences between the day-ahead and real-time market, which mitigates the
inc-dec game. Overall, the market efficiency improves substantially in our
examples, compared to standard zonal designs. In one of our examples, op-
timal zonal pricing is roughly as efficient as nodal pricing, which we use as a
benchmark.
The uncertainty between the day-ahead and real-time markets is modeled
by several scenarios. We formulate the two-stage price game as a two-stage
stochastic Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC). The
two-stage stochastic EPEC is reformulated as a two-stage stochastic MIBLP.
We propose a solution algorithm which combines nonconvex generalized Ben-
ders decomposition (NGBD) algorithm, see Li et al. (2011), and the primal-
relaxed dual (PRD) algorithm, which was applied by Floudas (2000). The
proposed NGBD-PRD solution algorithm decomposes the two-stage stochas-
tic MIBLP problem into a series of linear programs (LPs) and a mixed integer
linear program (MILP). These LPs and MILP are solved iteratively until the
-global solution is found. The computation time of the NGBD-PRD algo-
rithm is reduced using parallelization and GAMS’ multi-threading facility.
The developed model and the proposed algorithm are demonstrated on a
6-node system and the IEEE 24-node example system for the alternative
market designs that we consider.
The set of permissible price bids is discrete in our model. This means
that we have the set of equilibria under control. Our solution algorithm can
be programmed to solve for all equilibria, and we can verify that all best
responses are global best responses.
The system operator makes sure that there is a feasible dispatch for any
combination of bids. Thus similar to Willems (2002), we can avoid equilib-
rium ambiguities and the Generalized NE concept. These are well-known
issues in Cournot games where the move of one player directly sets its own
output and therefore constrains the permissible moves of other players in
capacity constrained transmission networks, as explained by Stoft (1999).
Our method is related to Zhang and Xu (2013), who analyze numerical
methods that can be used to solve for a two-stage stochastic EPEC. Zhang
et al. (2010) use a Cournot model and Zhang and Kim (2010) a linear supply
function equilibrium (SFE) model to study the strategic behaviour of gen-
erators that participate in a forward market and day-ahead market. Gupta
et al. (2015) model the two-stage game in day-ahead and real-time markets
for a radial three node network with nodal pricing. Hu and Ralph (2007)
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analyze bilevel games for spot markets with nodal pricing.
This paper organized as follows: Section 2 formulates the two-stage game.
The 6-node example system and the IEEE 24-node system are studied in
detail in Section 3 and 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Mathematical Model (MIBLP)
Market operator
(Economic dispatch considering 
net demand scenarios (ω) and 
all network constraints) 
Producer 1 Producer 2 Producer u 
Stage 1: 
Day-ahead market
Stage 2: 
Real-time market
Day-ahead
bids
Price and 
dispatch
Regulation
bids
Price and 
dispatch
Market operator
(Economic dispatch considering 
imbalance scenarios (ω,s) and 
all network constraints) 
(a) Benchmark market design with nodal pricing
Producer 1 Producer 2 Producer u 
Stage 1: 
Day-ahead market
Stage 2: 
Real-time market
Day-ahead
bids
Price and 
dispatch
Regulation
bids
Price and 
dispatch
Market operator
(Economic dispatch considering 
net demand scenarios (ω) and 
inter-zonal constraints) 
Market operator
(Economic dispatch considering 
imbalance scenarios (ω,s) and 
all network constraints) 
(b) Zonal market design in approaches 1, 2 and 3
Figure 1: The market designs considered in this study.
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We consider a two-settlement electricity market which employs zonal pric-
ing. The first settlement is the day-ahead market and the second one is
the real-time market. We assume that both markets are physical and that
oligopolistic producers participate in both markets. The zonal market design
and its benchmark is illustrated in Fig. 1. The electricity market is modeled
as a two-stage game under uncertainty. In the first stage, each generator
chooses its day-ahead bid considering the presumed day-ahead decisions of
its rivals and the Nash equilibrium in the real-time market. After genera-
tors submit their optimal day-ahead bids, the net-demand uncertainty (ω) is
realized and revealed to the all generators. In the second stage, each genera-
tor chooses its regulation bids given the day-ahead dispatch results and the
presumed regulation bids decisions of its rivals and submits it to the mar-
ket operator. With the realized net-demand shock (s), the market operator
clears the real-time market.
2.1. Nomenclature
Indices
u Generator, u = 1, ..., U
n Power system node, n = 1, ..., N
z Zone, z = 1, ..., Z
k Transmission line, k = 1, ..., K
l Inter-zonal line, l = 1, ..., L
t Index of Nash equilibria found, t = 1, ..., T
ω Net demand scenario, ω = 1, ...,Ω
s Net demand deviation scenario, s = 1, ..., S
a Bidding action of generator, a = 0, ..., A
Parameters (upper-case letters)
Hk,n PTDF matrix,
H ′l,z Zonal PTDF matrix,
Cu Marginal cost of unit u,
Cupu Marginal up-regulation cost of unit u,
Cdnu Marginal down-regulation cost of unit u,
Gu Installed capacity of unit u,
Fk Capacity of transmission line k,
F¯l Capacity of inter-zonal line l,
Dn,ω Net demand at node n in scenario ω,
Ba Step size of bidding action a,
W¯n,ω,s Wind production at node n,
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∆Wn,ω,s Deviation in net demand at node n and scenario ω, s,
ξω Probability of scenario ω,
σω,s Probability of scenario ω, s,
Ξµ,Ξβ,Ξϕ Upper bound of Lagrange multiplier µk,ω,s, βu,ω,s, ϕu,ω,s,
Variables (lower-case letters)
xu Binary variable of day-ahead bidding decision of unit u,
xupu,ω, (x
dn
u,ω) Binary variable for up-regulation (down-regulation)
bidding decision of unit u,
cˆu Price bid of unit u,
cˆupu,ω, (cˆ
dn
u,ω) Up-regulation (down-regulation) price bid of unit u
in scenario ω,
gu,ω Production level of unit u in scenario ω,
gupu,ω,s, (g
dn
u,ω,s) Up (down) regulation provided by unit u
in scenario ω, s,
vn,ω,s Wind spillage at node n in scenario ω, s,
ρn,ω,s, (pn,ω) Real-time (day-ahead) market price at node n
in scenario ω, s,
φu,ω,s Real-time profit of unit u in scenario ω, s,
piu,ω Day-ahead profit of unit u in scenario ω.
2.2. Competition in the real-time market
In this study, we consider three different pricing approaches in the real-
time market which are summarized in Table 1. Approach 1 assumes that
all accepted bids in the real-time market are paid their bid price as in the
real-time market in Britain. In approach 2, the real-time market applies
optimal zonal pricing, as in the day-ahead market by Bjørndal et al. (2012).
This means that all constraints of the network are considered by the real-
time market, but we add a set of extra constraints which require that the
clearing price must be the same for all nodes within a zone. We assume
that all accepted bids in the real-time market are paid with the marginal
zonal price (MZP). One of our purposes with this pricing approach is that
it should give similar prices as in the day-ahead market. This should reduce
arbitrage opportunities and mitigate the inc-dec game. In approach 3, we
determine the dispatch in a similar way as in approach 2. However, payments
can differ. Similar to approach 2, the generators are paid the marginal price
if the accepted regulation bid reduces the system imbalance. Otherwise they
are paid with their bid price. The latter case indicates that the accepted bid
is used to relieve congestion. Thus approach 3 is in-between approaches 1
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and 2. Moreover, approach 3 is reminiscent of the real-time markets in the
Nordic countries, where most bids are paid a zonal price, but bids that are
accepted in the counter-trading process, which relaxes overloaded lines, are
paid as bid.
Table 1: Real-Time pricing in the real-time market with zonal pricing, up-reg: Up-
regulation, dn-reg: Down-regulation, PAB: Pay-as-bid, MZP: Marginal zonal price.
Accepted bid
System need Approach 1 Approach 2 Approach 3
up-reg. dn-reg. up-reg. dn-reg. up-reg. dn-reg.
up-reg. PAB PAB MZP MZP MZP PAB
dn-reg. PAB PAB MZP MZP PAB MZP
To find a Nash equilibrium in the two-stage game is a large-scale and
complex problem. Solving this problem by exploring the entire solution space
is normally not feasible, see Huppmann and Siddiqui (2018). To the best of
our knowledge, no paper has attempted this for problems that are related
to our study. Instead, the typical approach is to reduce the solution space
by making the strategy set of bidders discrete as in Gabriel et al. (2013a),
Gabriel et al. (2013b), Fuller and Celebi (2017), Huppmann and Siddiqui
(2018) and Gabriel (2017). Similar to the these studies, we assume that
the generators choose their regulation bids from a discrete set of permissible
prices. In our model, each producer can choose a restricted number of prices
which are related to the marginal cost of the producer. Each producer has
unique costs and also a unique set of permissible prices. This means that
there are no ties, and that we do not need a rationing rule.
2.2.1. Single generator’s bidding problem in the real-time market
We want to solve for a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) in the
two-stage game. Thus whatever happened in the first-stage, generators will
play a Nash equilibrium in the second stage. It is most straightforward to
solve for a SPNE backwards, so we start with the last stage, the real-time
market. Each generator submits its up-regulation and down-regulation bids
to the real-time market given the dispatch results in the day-ahead market.
Moreover, we solve for a Nash equilibrium in the real-time market, so each
generator chooses a bid that is a best response to the bids of its rivals in the
real-time market. Hence, the strategic bidding decision of generator u in the
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real-time market is formulated as a two-stage stochastic bilevel program in
(1).
Maximize
xupu,a,ω ,xdnu,a,ω
Es|ω[φu,ω,s] (1a)
Subject to:
cˆupu,ω =
∑
a
Bax
up
u,a,ωC
up
u , cˆ
dn
u,ω =
∑
a
Bax
dn
u,a,ωC
dn
u (1b)
xupu,a,ω, x
dn
u,a,ω ∈ {0, 1} (1c)
where{gupu,ω,s, gdnu,ω,s, vn,ω,s} ∈
{
argMinimize
gupu,ω,s,gdnu,ω,s,vn,ω,s
∑
s,u
σω,s(cˆ
up
u,ωg
up
u,ω,s − cˆdnu,ωgdnu,ω,s) (1d)
Subject to:∑
u
(gu,ω + g
up
u,ω,s − gdnu,ω,s) =
∑
n
(vn,ω,s +Dn,ω −∆Wn,ω,s) : (αω,s) ∀ω, s (1e)
Fk −
∑
n
Hk,n
(∑
n:u
(gu,ω + g
up
u,ω,s − gdnu,ω,s)− vn,ω,s−
Dn,ω + ∆Wn,ω,s
) ≥ 0 : (µk,ω,s), ∀k, ω, s (1f)
0 ≤ gupu,ω,s ≤ (Gu − gu,ω) : (κu,ω,s, βu,ω,s) ∀u, ω, s (1g)
0 ≤ gdnu,ω,s ≤ gu,ω : (ψu,ω,s, ϕu,ω,s) ∀u, ω, s (1h)
0 ≤ vn,ω,s ≤ W¯n,ω + ∆Wn,ω,s : (θn,ω,s, χn,ω,s)
}
(1i)
The up-regulation and the down-regulation price bids are modeled us-
ing binary variables in (1b). Here parameter Ba represents the mark-up
(or mark-down) option in bidding action a. gu,ω represents the given dis-
patch levels in the day-ahead market. The optimization problem (1d)-(1i)
formulates the economic dispatch problem in the real-time market. The pro-
duction cost is minimized in (1d) considering the energy balance constraint
(1e), the transmission flow limits (1f), the capacity limits in (1g) and (1h)
and the wind spillage limit (1i). The Lagrange multipliers related to each
constraint are given in parenthesis. Since (1d)-(1i) is a linear program, the
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions are both necessary and sufficient for
a best response, which is shown by Gabriel et al. (2012). The complemen-
tary slackness condition is replaced by the strong duality conditions. The
complementary slackness conditions are given by the product of inequality
constraints and their related Lagrange multipliers should be equal to zero.
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For example, the complementary slackness conditions for constraint 0 ≤ gupu,ω,s
is gupu,ω,sκu,ω,s = 0. This is nonlinear due to the product of two continuous
variables. The number of nonlinear terms increases with the number of the
inequality constraints. However, when we replace the complementary slack-
ness conditions by the strong duality condition, then we can avoid a large
number of nonlinear constraints, and also represent them by a smaller num-
ber of linear constraints. This is explained in further detail in Appendix D.
The stationary, dual feasibility and strong duality conditions of (1d)-(1i) are
presented in (2a)-(2c),(2d) and (2e), respectively.
− σω,scˆupu,ω + αω,s −
∑
k,n:u
Hk,nµk,ω,s + κu,ω,s − βu,ω,s = 0, ∀u, ω, s (2a)
σω,scˆ
dn
u,ω − αω,s +
∑
k,n:u
Hk,nµk,ω,s + ψu,ω,s − ϕu,ω,s = 0, ∀u, ω, s (2b)
− αω,s +
∑
k,n
Hk,nµk,ω,s + θn,ω,s − χn,ω,s = 0, ∀n, ω, s (2c)
µk,ω,s, κu,ω,s, βu,ω,s, ψu,ω,s, ϕu,ω,s, θn,ω,s, χn,ω,s ≥ 0 (2d)
σω,s
∑
u
(−cˆupu,ωgupu,ω,s + cˆdnu,ωgdnu,ω,s)− (αω,s(
∑
u
gu,ω +
∑
n
(∆Wn,ω,s −Dn,ω))
+
∑
u
βu,ω,s(Gu − gu,ω) +
∑
u
ϕu,ω,sgu,ω +
∑
n
χn,ω,s(W¯n,ω + ∆Wn,ω,s)
+
∑
k
µk,ω,s(Fk −
∑
n
Hk,n(
∑
n:u
gu,ω + ∆Wn,ω,s −Dn,ω))) = 0, ∀ω, s (2e)
Bidding decisions cˆupu,ω and cˆ
dn
u,ω are defined using binary variables x
up
u,a,ω
and xdnu,a,ω in (1b). Replacing (1d)-(1i) with its KKT conditions (2a)-(2e),
we face two sets of bilinear terms in the resulting one-level program. These
terms are: (i) xupu,a,ωg
up
u,ω,s in (2e) and (ii) x
dn
u,a,ωg
dn
u,ω,s in (2e). In this case
the bilinear terms are the product of a binary and a continuous variable.
Hence, they can be linearized using the McCormick reformulation, see Gupte
et al. (2013). The McCormick reformulation is a technique for linearizing
the bilinear terms. To explain the method, assume that we want to lin-
earize xupu,a,ωg
up
u,ω,s. We first replace the bilinear term with a new variable
du,a,ω,s = x
up
u,a,ωg
up
u,ω,s and then add the following linear constraints. These
linear constraints are referred to as the McCormick envelopes for xupu,a,ωg
up
u,ω,s.
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gupu,ω,s +Gu(x
up
u,a,ω − 1) ≤ du,a,ω,s ≤ gupu,ω,s (3a)
0 ≤ du,a,ω,s ≤ Guxupu,a,ω (3b)
We derive the profit function of generator u in each real-time pricing
approach. In approach 1, the generators are paid with their bid price in the
real-time market. So the expected profit of generator u is:
Es|ω[φu,ω,s] =
∑
s
σω,s((cˆ
up
u,ω − Cupu )gupu,ω,s + Cdnu gdnu,ω,s − cˆdnu,ωgdnu,ω,s)
=
∑
s
σω,s
(∑
a
(Bag
up
u,ω,sx
up
u,a,ωC
up
u )− Cupu gupu,ω,s+ (4)
Cdnu g
dn
u,ω,s −
∑
a
(Bag
dn
u,ω,sx
dn
u,a,ωC
dn
u )
) ∀u, ω
In approach 2, the market operator accepts the regulation bids such that
nodal prices in each zone are equal to each other. Similar to the day-ahead
model by Bjørndal et al. (2012), we mathematically model this by including
the following constraints :∑
n:z
ρ′z,ω,s = ρn,ω,s,∀n, ω, s (5a)∑
u:z
ρ′z,ω,s ≥ cˆupu,ω + (Rz,ω,s − 1)Ξ,∀u, ω, s (5b)∑
u:z
ρ′z,ω,s ≤ cˆdnu,ω + (1−Rz,ω,s)Ξ,∀u, ω, s (5c)
Here the notation n : z represents the nodes which belongs to zone z, ρ′z,ω,s
represents the zonal price in zone z, and Ξ is a sufficiently large constant.
The set of constraints (5) ensures a uniform price at the nodes inside the
same zone. The parameter Rz,ω,s is set to 1 if there is deficit of generation
in zone z. Otherwise it is set to 0. Similarly, parameter Rz,ω,s is set to 1 if
there is excess of generation in zone z. Otherwise it is set to 0.
Adding a constraint involving dual variables as in (5) introduces a duality
gap as in Ruiz et al. (2012). This means that, for given bids, the dispatch
will be less optimal than nodal pricing. Hence, we change the right-hand
side value of (2e) from 0 to ¯ω,s. The calculation of parameter ¯ω,s will
be explained in Appendix C. In approach 2, the generators are paid with
the marginal zonal price in the real-time market. So the expected profit of
generator u is:
Es|ω[φu,ω,s] =
∑
s
σω,s((ρu,ω,s − Cupu )gupu,ω,s + (Cdnu − ρu,ω,s)gdnu,ω,s) (6)
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The real-time price faced by generator u can be written as in (7).
ρu,ω,s =
∑
u:n
(αω,s −
∑
k
Hk,nµk,ω,s)/σω,s (7)
From (2a), (2b) and the complementary slackness conditions for (1g) and
(1h), the profit in the real-time market in approach 2 is:
Es|ω[φu,ω,s] =
∑
s
(βu,ω,s(Gu − gu,ω) + ϕu,ω,sgu,ω) +
∑
s
σω,s(C
dn
u g
dn
u,ω,s− (8)∑
a
(Bag
dn
u,ω,sx
dn
u,a,ωC
dn
u )) +
∑
s
σω,s(
∑
a
(Bag
up
u,ω,sx
up
u,a,ωC
up
u )− Cupu gupu,ω,s) ∀u, ω
The bilinear terms gdnu,ω,sx
dn
u,a,ω and g
up
u,ω,sx
up
u,a,ω in (4) and (8) are linearized
using the McCormick reformulation.
Approach 3 has the same allocation mechanism as approach 2, but the
transaction prices differ, which influences the profit function. In approach 3,
the profit of generator u is a combination of (4) and (8). It can be calculated
as follows:
Es|ω[φu,ω,s] =
∑
a,s
σω,s(C
dn
u g
dn
u,ω,s − Cupu gupu,ω,s + (Bagupu,ω,sxupu,a,ωCupu − (9)
Bag
dn
u,ω,sx
dn
u,a,ωC
dn
u )) +
∑
a,s,z:u
(Rz,ω,sβu,ω,s(Gu − gu,ω) +Rz,ω,sϕu,ω,sgu,ω) ∀u, ω
We used the nodal pricing regime as a benchmark in our study. We model
it as a zonal system with one node per zone so the profit function of the
benchmark model is (8). Table 2 summarizes the two-stage stochastic model
of each real-time pricing approach.
Table 2: The two-stage stochastic model in each real-time pricing approach, O.F.:Objective
function, Cons: Constraints, M.E.: McCormick Envelopes.
Approach 1 Approach 2 Approach 3 Benchmark
(MILP) (MILP) (MILP) (MILP)
O.F. (1a) (1a) (1a) (1a)
Cons. (1b)-(1c) (1b)-(1c) (1b)-(1c) (1b)-(1c)
(1e)-(1i) (1e)-(1i),(5) (1e)-(1i),(5) (1e)-(1i)
(2a)-(2e),(4) (2a)-(2e),(8) (2a)-(2e),(9) (2a)-(2e),(8)
M.E. for gupu,ω,sx
up
u,a,ω, g
dn
u,ω,sx
dn
u,a,ω
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2.2.2. Nash equilibrium in the real-time market
The Nash equilibrium in the real-time market given the day-ahead dis-
patch decisions is found by solving all generators’ real-time problems simulta-
neously. Since the regulation bids are discrete variables, the set {cˆup,(1)u,ω ,cˆdn,(1)u,ω ,
cˆ
up,(2)
u,ω , cˆ
dn,(2)
u,ω ,..., cˆ
up,(I)
u,ω ,cˆ
dn,(I)
u,ω } is formed by different combinations of binary
variables xupu,a,ω, x
dn
u,a,ω. Then the objective function of MILP model of each
generator is replaced by:
Es|ω[φu,ω,s] ≥ Es|ω[φ(i)u,ω,s] ∀u, i, ω (10)
This transforms the MILP model of each generator to a set of mixed-integer
linear constraints. The Nash equilibrium in the real-time market is found by
solving the system of these mixed-integer linear constraints. We denote this
system by RTNEω.
2.3. Competition in the day-ahead market
In the day-ahead market, the generators choose their day-ahead bids from
a discrete set of permissible prices. Similar to the real-time market, each
producer has a unique set of permissible price bids. We consider cases where
the market operator has set the flow limits between the zones for the day-
ahead dispatch at a level which ensures security of the power system.
2.3.1. Single generator’s bidding problem in the day-ahead market
We solve for a SPNE. Thus, generator u submits an optimal bid to the
day-ahead market given the day-ahead bids of its rivals and considering the
resulting Nash equilibrium in the real-time market.
Maximize
Λ
Eω[(pu,ω − Cu)gu,ω + Es|ω[φu,ω,s]] (11a)
Subject to:
cˆu =
∑
a
Baxu,aCu, (1b) (11b)
xu,a, x
up
u,a,ω, x
dn
u,a,ω ∈ {0, 1} (11c)
where{pu,ω, gu,ω} ∈
{
argMinimize
gu,ω
∑
u,ω
ξω(cˆugu,ω) (11d)∑
u
gu,ω =
∑
n
Dn,ω : (λω) ∀ω (11e)
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F¯l −
∑
z
H ′l,z(
∑
z:u,n
gu,ω −Dn,ω) ≥ 0 : (γl,ω) ∀l, ω (11f)
0 ≤ gu,ω ≤ Gu : (ηu,ω, νu,ω) ∀u, ω
}
(11g)
RTNEω ∀ω, (11h)
where Λ = {cˆu, cˆupu,ω, cˆdnu,ω, xu,a, xupu,a,ω, xdnu,a,ω, gupu,ω,s, gdnu,ω,s, µk,ω,s, κu,ω,s, βu,ω,s,
ψu,ω,s, ϕu,ω,s, αω,s, θn,ω,s, χn,ω,s, φu,ω,s, φ
(i)
u,ω,s}.
Equation (11b) models the price bids that generator u submitted to the
day-ahead market. The expected total stated operation cost, which is based
on producers’ bids, is minimized in (11d) considering the energy balance con-
straint (11e), the inter-zonal transmission limits (11f) and generation limits
(11g). Since problem (11d)-(11g) is a linear program, it is replaced by its
equivalent KKT conditions.
After replacing αω,s
∑
u gu,ω in (2e) with
∑
nDn,ω from (11e), there are
three sets of bilinear terms in (11). These are (i) pu,ωgu,ω in (11a), (ii) cˆugu,ω
in the strong duality condition of (11d-11g), (iii)
∑
kHk,nµk,ω,sgu,ω, βu,ω,sgu,ω
and ϕu,ω,sgu,ω in (2e).
The day-ahead price is pz,ω = (λω −
∑
lH
′
l,zγl,ω)/ξω. From the stationary
condition for (11d-11g) and complementary slackness conditions for (11g),
the profit function becomes as follows:
Eω[piu,ω] =
∑
ω
νu,ωGu +
∑
ω
ξωgu,ωCu(
∑
a
Baxu,a − 1), ∀u (12)
Here the term gu,ωxu,a appears both in (12) and in the strong duality
condition for (11d-11g). It is linearized using the McCormick reformulation
as explained before. After this reformulation, the bilinear terms in (11) are∑
k,n:uHk,nµk,ω,sgu,ω, βu,ω,sgu,ω and ϕu,ω,sgu,ω. These bilinear terms are the
product of two continuous variables. It is known that the exact linearization
of this type of bilinearity is not possible, see for example Costa and Liberti
(2012). Therefore, the resulting model for each generator is a MIBLP.
Our benchmark model is the nodal pricing model. Mathematically, the
only difference to the zonal day-ahead model is that constraint (11f) is re-
placed by the constraint (Fk −
∑
nHk,n(
∑
k:u,n gu,ω −Dn,ω) ≥ 0).
2.3.2. Subgame Perfect NE in the two-stage game
The SPNE is found by solving all MIBLPs of generators simultaneously.
Since each generator chooses its price bids from a finite set of choices, we
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replace the objective function of the MIBLP model of each generator with
(13).
Eω[piu,ω + Es|ω[φu,ω,s]] ≥ Eω[pi(j),(i)u,ω + Es|ω[φ(i)u,ω,s]] ∀u, i, j (13)
This transforms the MIBLP model to a set of mixed-integer bilinear con-
straints (MIBLCs). The Nash equilibrium of the two-stage bidding game is
found by solving the MIBLCs of all generators together. This is formulated
in (14) as an optimization problem. Inequality (13) is reformulated in (14c)
by introducing the nonnegative slack variable ζu. The Nash equilibrium of
the two-stage bidding game is found when ζu equals to 0. The two-stage
bidding game is formulated in (14).
Minimize
Λ′
∑
u
ζu (14a)
(11b), (11c), (12)
KKT conditions of (11d)-(11g)
McCormick envelopes for gu,ωxu,a
RTNEω ∀ω
Eω[piu,ω + Es|ω[φu,ω,s]]− Eω[pi(j),(i)u,ω − Es|ω[φ(i)u,ω,s]] + ζu ≥ 0, ∀u, i, j (14b)
ζu ≥ 0, ∀u (14c)
Problem (14) is a MIBLP and Λ′ = Λ∪ {pi(j),(i)u,ω , pu,ω, gu,ω, λω, γl,ω, ηu,ω, νu,ω}.
2.4. Tackling Multiple Nash equilibria
The number of generators and the number of strategies available for each
generator influences the existence and the number of Nash equilibria. In
case of multiple Nash equilibria, the market outcomes may differ between
different Nash equilibria, which would complicate the market analysis. This
study uses two methodologies to tackle the multiple Nash equilibria.
Methodology 1: In methodology 1, we find all Nash equilibria. To do
this, after we solve the model in (14) and find a Nash equilibrium, we
add integer cut (C.5e) to remove the found Nash equilibrium from the
solution space. This procedure is repeated until the objective value of
(14) becomes a positive value. This means that no Nash equilibrium is
left in the solution space.
Methodology 2: Large-scale examples require long computation times to
solve the MIBLP model in (14), and it might not be practical to find
all Nash equilibria. Another way of tackling multiple Nash equilibria is
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to find the extremal (Worst/Best production cost) Nash equilibria as
in Hesamzadeh and Biggar (2012). However, we have to modify their
approach as we will apply methodology 2 to a problem that is much
larger than in Hesamzadeh and Biggar (2012). We find a lower bound of
the best production-cost Nash equilibrium and an upper bound of the
worst production cost Nash equilibrium. Using the upper bound and
the lower bound, we build an envelope which covers all Nash equilibria
as in Hesamzadeh and Biggar (2013) (see Fig. 2). The lower bound of
the envelope is calculated by total production cost when all generators
bids their marginal costs to the both markets. The computation of the
upper bound is explained in Appendix A. After finding the upper and
the lower bound of the envelope, the interval between the upper bound
and the lower bound is divided into subintervals with a tolerance (i.e.
tolerance= X2−X1
X2
). The MIBLP model in (14) is solved in each of these
subintervals in a parallelized way, and a representative Nash equilib-
rium is found in each subinterval. This methodology enables us to find
a set of representative Nash equilibria with a controlled tolerance.
Subinterval-1 Subinterval-2 Subinterval-P
LB UB
X1 X2 XP-1
Figure 2: Equilibria envelope, LB: Lower bound of the best production cost Nash equilib-
rium, UB: Upper bound of the worst production cost Nash equilibrium, X1: Upper limit
of the subinterval-1.
One issue here is that there might not be a Nash equilibrium in ev-
ery subinterval. We design a pre-feasibility-check method to find the
subintervals which has no Nash equilibrium without solving the model
in (14). The details of the pre-feasibility-check method is explained in
Appendix B. Using this method, we identify the subintervals which has
no Nash equilibrium, omit those subintervals, and then we compute the
Nash equilibria.
2.5. Solution algorithm
The MIBLP model in (14) is a large scale model and it cannot be solved
by the commercial MIBLP solvers in the GAMS environment. We solve the
MIBLP model using a solution algorithm which is a combination of (i) the
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nonconvex generalized Benders decomposition (NGBD) algorithm applied by
Li et al. (2011) and (ii) the primal-relaxed dual (PRD) algorithm used by
Floudas (2000).
It is computationally hard to solve a large scale Bilinear Program (BLP);
it requires a long computation time. Thus our approach avoids BLP as much
as possible. Our solution algorithm is an iterative process. We only report
equilibria for our setting, but we use a McCormick relaxation McCormick
(1976) when finding equilibrium candidates, i.e. we use a MILP relaxation
of the MIBLP model when looking for equilibrium candidates. The resulting
MILP model is easier to solve compared to the MIBLP model. The solution
of the MILP model gives us a candidate SPNE. To ensure that the candidate
equilibrium is a SPNE, the binary variables in the MIBLP model is fixed
at their values in the candidate equilibrium and the obtained BLP model
is solved. We reject candidates that are not SPNE for our setting. Once
a solution has been found, we add an integer cut to make sure that a new
candidate equilibrium is found in the next iteration. This process continues
until a SPNE is found. In the 6-node example, we continue until all SPNE
have been found. This approach means that we do not have to consider all
possible combinations of binary variables, which would require us to solve
the BLP model many times. The details of the solution algorithm can be
found in the appendix C.
3. Illustrative Example
3
2 5
61
u1
4
u3w1
w2u2
Zone 1 Zone 2
Figure 3: Single line diagram of 6-node example system, u1,u2, u3: Conventional genera-
tors, W1, W2: Wind farms.
This section demonstrates the generators’ bidding behaviors under dif-
ferent zonal pricing approaches for the 6-node that was used by Chao and
Peck (1998). The considered time period is one hour. Fig. 3 shows the
single line diagram of the illustrative example. We consider two zones. Zone
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1 aggregates nodes 1, 2 and 3. Zone 2 aggregates nodes 4, 5 and 6. The
6-node example system has 3 competing generators u1, u2 and u3 which are
located at nodes 1, 2 and 4, respectively. The data related to the generators
is presented in Table 3. The transmission capacity of the lines between nodes
1-2, 2-5 and 1-6 are set to 35 MW, 65 MW and 65 MW, respectively. The
transmission capacity of the other lines is set to 100 MW. For the day-ahead
market, the market operator sets the flow limit between zones 1 and 2 to 110
MW. The consumers located at nodes 2, 5 and 6 have fixed demand of 120
MW, 100 MW and 60 MW, respectively. Two wind farms are connected to
nodes 3 and 6. Two wind generation scenarios are considered: 30 MW and
37.5 MW. In real-time, the deviation from the net demand (∆Wn,ω,s) is mod-
eled with 2 scenarios. Scenario s1 represents the positive imbalance scenario
(∆Wn,ω,s1 = 0.2Wn,ω), scenario s2 represents the negative imbalance scenario
(∆Wn,ω,s2 = −0.2Wn,ω). We assume that each generator has 3 bidding ac-
tions for day-ahead price bids with 0%, 10% mark-up and 10% mark-down.
In real-time, the permissible up-regulation and down-regulation bids have
0%, 10%, 20% mark-up and 0%, 10%, 20% mark-down, respectively.
Table 3: Unit data for the 6-node system.
Unit C Cup Cdn Gu
($/MWh) ($/MWh) ($/MWh) (MW)
u1 11.5 23 7.5 150
u2 10.5 21 6.5 250
u3 13 25 8.5 150
All generators submit their equilibrium bids (cˆu) to the day-ahead market.
A short time before the delivery hour, units u1, u2 and u3 consider the day-
ahead dispatch results (including the wind power output) and submit their
regulation bids to the real-time market. We use methodology 1 to tackle
multiple Nash equilibria in this example. We report all Nash equilibria with
different production costs. The SPNE for each market design is shown in
Table 4. We observe that in approaches 1 and 3, u1’s down-regulation bid and
u2’s up-regulation bid is accepted in all real-time scenarios (ω, s) due to the
inc-dec game. That’s why any combination of up/down-regulation bid of u3,
up-regulation bid of u1 and down-regulation bid of u2 is a Nash equilibrium.
The dispatches and payoffs are the same in each one of these Nash equilibria,
and therefore we only report one Nash equilibrium for approach 1 and 3 in
Table 4. For approach 2 and the benchmark approach we found two Nash
equilibria (A2-1 and A2-2) and three Nash equilibria (BA-1, BA-2 and BA-3),
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Table 4: The SPNE for each approach and the expected profit of each generator, A1:
Approach 1, A2: Approach 2, A3: Approach 3, BA: Benchmark approach, A2-1: First
Nash equilibrium in approach 2, BA-1; First Nash equilibrium in the benchmark approach.
u1 u2 u3
cˆu
(cˆupu,ω,cˆ
dn
u,ω) cˆu
(cˆupu,ω,cˆ
dn
u,ω) cˆu
(cˆupu,ω,cˆ
dn
u,ω)
ω1 ω2 ω1 ω2 ω1 ω2
A1 10.35 (23,6) (23,6) 11.55 (25.2,5.2) (25.2,5.2) 14.3 (30,7.65) (30,7.65)
A2-1 12.65 (25.3,6) (27.6,6) 11.55 (21,5.2) (21,5.2) 14.3 (30,8.5) (30,8.5)
A2-2 11.5 (23,7.5) (27.6,7.5) 10.5 (21,5.2) (21,5.2) 14.3 (30,8.5) (30,8.5)
A3 10.35 (27.6,6) (27.6,6) 11.55 (25.2,5.2) (25.2,5.2) 14.3 (30,6.8) (30,6.8)
BA-1 11.5 (27.6,6) (25.3,6) 11.55 (25.2,5.2) (25.2,5.85) 11.7 (30,6.8) (27.5,6.8)
BA-2 11.5 (23,6) (25.3,6) 11.55 (25.2,5.2) (25.2,5.85) 11.7 (25,6.8) (27.5,6.8)
BA-3 11.5 (23,6) (23,6) 11.55 (25.2,6.5) (25.2,6.5) 11.7 (25,8.5) (25,8.5)
respectively.
Table 4 shows that in approaches 1 and 3, generator u1 chooses a day-
ahead bid which is lower than its marginal cost, which is consistent with an
inc-dec strategy, see Harvey and Hogan (2000a). Table 5 presents further
results that are consistent with the inc-dec game. It shows that the day-
ahead dispatches in approaches 1 and 3 overload the intra-zonal line, line
1-2, by 32.1 MW in scenario ω1 and by 34.6 MW in scenario ω2. Here node 1
is the export-constrained node and node 2 is the import constraint node. To
relieve this overloading, the market operator accepts u1’s down-regulation bid
and u2’s up-regulation bid in every scenario. Accordingly, generator u1 buys
back in the real-time market and generator u2 sells the energy, as reported
in Table 5.
Table 5: Overloaded volume in the line 1-2 and the accepted counter-traded volume in the
real-time market for A1 and A3, CT: Counter-traded volume.
Scenario ω ω1 ω2
Line 1-2 (MW) 32.1 34.6
Scenario s ω1, s1 ω1, s2 ω2, s1 ω2, s2
CT (MWh) 49.4 48.6 52.3 51.2
Table 6 shows that generator u1 increases its total expected profit by at
least eight times in approaches 1 and 3 compared to the benchmark approach
(nodal pricing) due to the inc-dec game. Table 7 shows that producers’ total
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Table 6: The profit of each generator for each real-time pricing approach; , A1: Approach 1,
A2: Approach 2, A3: Approach 3, BA: Benchmark approach, A2-1: First Nash equilbirium
in approach 2, BA-1; First Nash equilibrium in the benchmark approach, ∆u = Eω[piu,ω +
Es|ω[φu,ω,s]], Φu = Eω[Es|ω[φu,ω,s]].
piu ($/h) Φu ($/h) ∆u ($/h)
u1 u2 u3 u1 u2 u3 u1 u2 u3
A1 7.5 48.6 21.1 85.7 240 0 93.2 288.5 21.1
A2-1 0 206.1 21.1 0 21.4 27.1 0 227.5 48.2
A2-2 0 0 21.1 0 21.4 27.1 0 21.4 48.2
A3 7.5 48.6 21.1 111.5 316 0 93.2 288.5 21.1
BA-1 0 234.2 0 10.1 28.4 0 10.1 262.5 0
BA-2 0 234.2 0 10.1 21.6 0 10.1 255.8 0
BA-3 0 234.2 0 5.4 13.2 0 5.4 247.3 0
profits increase by 50-90%. Approach 2 is constructed to reduce the inc-
dec game by setting the price in the day-ahead and real-time markets in
a similar way, which reduces arbitrage opportunities. Indeed, we observe
that in approach 2, the day-ahead dispatches do not overload any line in
the network, when the generators bid their strategic day-ahead bids (A2)
or their marginal costs (WALZ2) to the day-ahead market. This causes a
significant decrease in the profit of u1 in approach 2 compared to its profit
in approaches 1 and 3. Similarly, we see in Table 7 that total profits for A2
is similar to the benchmark. Depending on equilibrium selection, A2 could
even have significantly lower total profits compared to nodal pricing.
Table 7 shows the production cost in the day-ahead and real-time markets
for each real-time pricing approach. We observe that approach 2 has a much
lower production cost compared to approaches 1 and 3. The benchmark with
nodal pricing has roughly the same production costs as approach 2.
Strategic bidding means that firms increase their profits by making state-
ments of costs that do not correspond to their true costs. This leads to
inefficiencies and higher (true) production costs. Depending on equilibrium
selection, strategic bidding in approach 2 increases the production cost by
2-10% compared to case WALZ where all generators bids their true marginal
cost. Similarly, the strategic bidding in the benchmark approach increases
2We define WALZ as a naive competitive equilibrium in market design A2 where the
generators bid their true marginal costs to both day-ahead and real-time markets.
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the production cost by 10% compared to the case WAL3 where all generators
bids their true marginal costs.
Table 7: The production cost and the total profit (
∑
u ∆u) for each market design. PC
DA:
The production cost in the day-ahead dispatch ($/h), PCRT : The production cost in the
real-time dispatch ($/h), TPC: The total production cost ($/h), WAL: Naive competitive
bidding in BA, WALZ: Naive competitive bidding in A2.
PCDA PCRT TPC
∑
u ∆u
WAL 2232.64 104.43 2337.07 0.56
WALZ 2271.88 101.29 2373.17 15.72
A1 2319.06 1096.96 3416.02 402.85
A2-1 2499.06 119.05 2618.11 275.69
A2-2 2293.56 119.05 2412.61 69.62
A3 2319.06 1096.96 3416.02 504.68
BA-1 2449.33 129.6 2578.93 272.65
BA-2 2449.33 126.06 2575.39 265.9
BA-3 2449.33 120.08 2569.41 252.76
In this example system, each generator has 3x3=9 (3 up-regulation, 3
down-regulation) strategies for each scenario ω. We consider 2 net-demand
scenarios in the day-ahead market, so each generator has 9x9=81 possible
strategies when deciding on the real-time bid. Each generator also has three
possible strategies for its day-ahead bid. Thus, in the two-stage game, each
generator has 81x3=243 possible strategies. Since we have 3 generators in the
example system, the total number of bid combinations is 14,348,907. If we
iterate over each of these combinations and each solution takes hypothetically
1 second, the computation of the SPNE will take approximately 166 days.
However our solution algorithm can compute the SPNE in moderate time by
first using a MILP model to identify equilibrium candidates, which are then
evaluated in detail.
3We define WAL as a naive competitive equilibrium in the benchmark market design
where the generators bid their true marginal costs to both day-ahead and real-time mar-
kets.
21
4. IEEE 24-node example system
An original version of the IEEE 24-node example system is presented
by Grigg et al. (1999). In this subsection we modify this example somewhat
and use it to demonstrate our zonal pricing models and the proposed solution
algorithm in a larger system. We consider three zones. Zone 1 aggregates
nodes 15-23. Zone 2 aggregates nodes 11-14 and 24. Zone 3 aggregates nodes
1-10. The transmission capacity of the lines between nodes 1-2, 3-24, 14-16
and 21-22 are set to 200 MW, 175 MW, 200 MW and 425 MW, respectively.
For the day-ahead market, the market operator sets the flow limits between
zones 1 and 2 to 400 MW and between zones 2 and 3 to 820 MW. The data
related to the generators is presented in Table 8.
Table 8: Unit data for 24-node system.
Unit node C Cup Cdn Gu
($/MWh) ($/MWh) ($/MWh) (MW) )
u1 1 19 27 11 500
u2 2 15.5 23.5 11.5 400
u3 13 14.5 22.5 9.5 600
u4 21 13 20.5 7 1200
u5 22 13.5 21.5 8.5 1100
Table 9: The net demand deviation scenarios.
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6
∆Wn,ω1,s (MWh) 51.3 42.75 34.2 25.65 17.1 0
s7 s8 s9 s10 s11
∆Wn,ω1,s (MWh) -17.1 -25.65 -34.2 -42.75 -51.3
Five wind farms are connected to nodes 8, 11, 12, 16 and 23. One wind
generation scenario (171 MW) is considered. The deviation from the net
demand is modeled with 11 scenarios shown in Table 9. Scenario s1, s2, s3,
s4, and s5 represent the positive imbalance scenarios, scenario s6 represents
the no imbalance scenario and scenarios s7, s8, s9, s10, and s11 represent the
negative imbalance scenario. We assume that each generator has 3 bidding
actions for day-ahead price bids: 0%, 10% mark-up and 10% mark-down.
For up- and down-regulation bids in the real-time market, we allow for 0%,
10%, 20% mark-up and 0%, 10%, 20% mark-down, respectively.
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Table 10: SPNE in the subintervals, SI: Subinterval, TPC: Total production cost ($/h),
Fail: Failed from pre-feasibility check, no SPNE: Passed from pre-feasibility check but no
SPNE found by the solution algorithm.
SI# TPC interval A1 A2 A3 TPC interval BA
SI1 28492.6-31342 no SPNE SPNE no SPNE 28502.7-31353 SPNE
SI2 31342-34476 SPNE Fail SPNE 31353-34488 Fail
SI3-SI10 34476-73903 Fail Fail Fail 34488-73929 Fail
We apply methodology 2 to tackle multiple Nash equilibria. The lower
and upper bound of the envelope is calculated as 28492.6 $/h and 73903 $/h
for A1, A2 and A3 and 28502.7 $/h and 73929 $/h for BA. We split the
envelops in 10 subintervals by setting the tolerance as 10%. Table 10 shows
that, according to the pre-feasibility check, there are no SPNE in subintervals
between SI3 and SI10 for A1 and A3. Using our solution algorithm we solve
the SPNE model in (14) for subinterval-1 and subinterval-2. For A1 and A3,
we find a representative Nash equilibrium in SI2, but not in SI1. For A2 and
BA, all subintervals between SI2 and SI10 fails in the pre-feasibility check,
and we find a representative Nash equilibrium in SI1.
Table 11: The SPNE in each approach, A1: Approach 1, A2: Approach 2, A3: Approach
3, BA: Benchmark approach, cˆu: Day-ahead price bid ($/MWh), (cˆ
up
u , cˆ
dn
u ): Up and down
regulation price bid ($/MWh,$/MWh).
u1 u2 u3 u4 u5
A1
cˆu 20.9 17.05 15.95 14.3 12.15
(cˆupu , cˆ
dn
u ) (32.4,8.8) (28.2,9.2) (24.75,7.6) (24.6,5.6) (23.65,6.8)
A2
cˆu 20.9 17.05 15.95 14.3 14.85
(cˆupu , cˆ
dn
u ) (32.4,9.9) (23.5,11.5) (22.5,9.5) (20.5,5.6) (21.5,8.5)
A3
cˆu 20.9 17.05 15.95 14.3 12.15
(cˆupu , cˆ
dn
u ) (32.4,9.9) (25.85,10.35) (22.5,7.6) (24.6,6.3) (23.65,6.8)
BA
cˆu 20.9 15.50 15.95 14.3 13.5
(cˆupu , cˆ
dn
u ) (32.4,9.9) (25.85,10.35) (27,8.55) (24.6,6.3) (23.65,6.8)
Table 11 shows that in approaches 1 and 3, u5 chooses a day-ahead bid
which is lower than its marginal cost and becomes the cheapest generator
in the market. We observe in Table 12 that the day-ahead dispatches in
approaches 1 and 3 overload the intra-zonal line between nodes 21 and 22
by 233.78 MW. To relieve this overloading, the volumes reported in Table 12
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are counter-traded in the real-time market. Generators u3, u4 and u5 provide
the necessary up-regulation (u3, u4) and down-regulation (u5) for counter-
trading. In contrast, we observe that no transmission line is overloaded when
the generators bid their strategic day-ahead bids (A2) or their marginal costs
(WALZ) to the day-ahead market when there is optimal zonal pricing in the
real-time market. Table 13 shows that u4 increases its total profit by 114%
in A1 and by 335% in A3 compared to the benchmark approach. Moreover
u5 increases its profit by 20.6 times in A1 and by 21.9 times in A3, compared
to the benchmark approach.
Table 12: Overloading volume for the line between nodes 21 and 22 and the volume of
accepted regulation bids for counter-trading (CT) in each scenario in A1 and A3.
Line 21-22 (MWh) 233.78
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6
CT (MWh) 133.69 172.63 211.57 250.51 289.45 367.33
s7 s8 s9 s10 s11
CT (MWh) 359.71 356.58 354.52 352.46 350.94
Table 13: The profit of each generator in each real-time pricing approaches; piu ($/h):
Profit in the day-ahead market, Φu ($/h): Expected profit in the real-time market, ∆u
($/h): Total profit in both markets.
A1 A2
u1 u2 u3 u4 u5 u1 u2 u3 u4 u5
piu 0 520.8 778.65 22.1 880 0 520.8 778.65 1452.1 0
Φu 7 64.9 59.62 1327.38 621.1 9.54 230.79 427.9 406.26 31.51
∆u 7 585.7 838.27 1349.48 1501.1 9.54 751.59 1206.55 1858.36 31.51
A3 BA
u1 u2 u3 u4 u5 u1 u2 u3 u4 u5
piu 0 520.8 778.65 22.1 880 0 739.35 556.9 597.31 0
Φu 7 122.9 283.5 2714.1 713.54 3.65 43.52 342.48 32.26 69.59
∆u 7 643.7 1062.15 2736.2 1593.54 3.65 782.87 899.38 629.57 69.59
Table 14 illustrates that approach 2 has the lowest production cost and
approaches 1 and 3 have the highest production cost among the zonal market
designs. The strategic bidding in approach 2 increases the production cost by
9.7% compared to case WALZ where all generators bids their true marginal
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cost. Similarly, the strategic bidding in the benchmark approach increases
the production cost by 6.9% compared to case WAL where all generators bids
their true marginal costs. In this example, the total profit of generators is
lower in approach 2 in comparison to approach 1 and 3, but it is significantly
higher than the benchmark approach.
Table 14: The production cost and the total profit (
∑
u ∆u) in each market designs, PC
DA:
The production cost in the day-ahead dispatch, PCRT : The production cost in the real-
time dispatch, TPC: The total production cost, WAL: Naive competitive bidding in BA,
WALZ: Naive competitive bidding in A2.
PCDA PCRT TPC
∑
u ∆u
($/h) ($/h) ($/h) ($/h)
WAL 27480.38 1022.33 28502.71 122.97
WALZ 27515.5 977.1 28492.6 577.45
A1 27902.05 6567.12 34469.17 4281.56
A2 30267.05 989.65 31256.7 3857.54
A3 27902.05 6455.82 34357.87 6042.59
BA 28973.54 1417.74 30391.28 2385.07
5. Conclusion
This paper applies a two-stage game to study oligopolistic competition
of generators in zonally-priced electricity markets with a day-ahead and a
real-time market. The two-stage game is mathematically formulated as a
two-stage stochastic EPEC and it is recast into a two-stage stochastic MI-
BLP. The developed model is solved using a combination of the nonconvex
generalized Benders decomposition and the primal relaxed-dual algorithms.
Our solution algorithm decomposes the MIBLP problem into a series of a
mixed-integer linear program and linear programs and solves them iteratively.
The developed two-stage stochastic MIBLP model and the NGBD-PRD so-
lution algorithm are demonstrated on the 6-node and IEEE 24-node example
systems.
Our numerical results illustrate that the inc-dec game can lead to large
production inefficiencies and large profits for producers in zonal electricity
markets in comparison to nodal pricing. However, our results also illustrate
how the inc-dec game can be mitigated by modifying the design of the real-
time market, such that price differences within a zone are minimized. This
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extra constraint in the real-time market would normally introduce welfare
losses. On the other hand the extra constraint means that prices in the day-
ahead and real-time market are set in a more similar way, which reduces
the arbitrage opportunities. This mitigates the inc-dec game and the excess
profits associated with this game.
Appendix A. Calculating the upper bound of the Nash equilibria
envelope
To find the upper bound of the envelope, objective function (14a) and
constraint (14c) in model (14) are replaced by (A.1) and (13), respectively.
Maximize
∑
s,u
σω,s(cˆ
up
u,ωg
up
u,ω,s − cˆdnu,ωgdnu,ω,s) +
∑
u,ω
ξω(cˆugu,ω) (A.1)
Moreover the bilinear terms
∑
k,n:uHk,nµk,ω,sgu,ω,
∑
u βu,ω,sgu,ω and∑
u ϕu,ω,sgu,ω in (14) are replaced by τu,ω,s, τˆu,ω,s and τ¯u,ω,s which is bounded
through constraints (C.1), (C.2), (C.3), respectively. This transforms the
MIBLP model in (14) into a MILP model. The solution of the resulting
MILP model gives the upper bound of the envelope.
Appendix B. Pre-feasibility check method
Our method is based on two properties of the duality: (i) The dual of
a nonconvex problem is always a convex problem Boyd and Vandenberghe
(2004) and (ii) if a problem is infeasible, the dual of this problem is un-
bounded Boyd and Vandenberghe (2004). To use these properties, we for-
mulate the problem based on (14) by replacing
∑
u ζu in (14a) by
∑
ω,s ˆω,s
and replacing (14c) by (13). The resulting problem is a MIBLP and it is
infeasible if there is no Nash equilibrium in a given subinterval. Instead of
solving nonconvex MIBLP, we relaxed the integrality constraints of the bi-
nary variables and take the dual of it. The dual problem is an LP model
and it is easier to solve compared to the MIBLP. We solve the dual problem
in each subinterval. We may face two cases: (i) if the dual problem has
a finite solution, there might be a Nash equilibrium in this subinterval or
(ii) if the dual problem is unbounded, there is no Nash equilibrium in this
subinterval. Using this method, we identify the subintervals which has no
Nash equilibrium and reduce the number of subintervals we search for the
Nash equilibrium. Note that due to the nonconvexity of the MIBLP, in some
subintervals we may have a finite dual solution but there might not be a Nash
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equilibrium. However if the dual solution is unbounded, it is guaranteed that
there is no Nash equilibrium in a subinterval.
Appendix C. Solution Algorithm
The MIBLP model in (14) is solved by a combination of (i) the nonconvex
generalized Benders decomposition (NGBD) algorithm Li et al. (2011) and
(ii) the primal-relaxed dual (PRD) algorithm Floudas (2000). The NGBD
algorithm first decomposes the MIBLP model into MILP and BLP models.
The MILP model is solved by a standard Benders decomposition algorithm
by iterating between the relaxed MILP (RMILP) model and LP model. To
ensure the -global solution for the MIBLP, the BLP model needs to be
solved to -global solution. The BARON Tawarmalani and Sahinidis (2005)
solver in GAMS can solve a BLP problem to -global optimum. In our tests,
the BARON solver can solve the BLP model in small-scale case studies.
However, it cannot return any solution in larger case studies. Therefore, we
use the parallelized PRD algorithm to solve the large scale BLP models. The
PRD algorithm solves the BLP model by iterating between lower-bound and
upper-bound LPs. The concept of the NGBD-PRD algorithm is shown in
Fig. C.4.
LP1
RMILP
PRD 
algorithm
Benders 
decomposition
LP2
LP3
Integer  
decisions
NGBD 
algorithm
MILP model BLP model
Figure C.4: The concept of the NGBD-PRD algorithm.
Appendix C.1. MILP model
The MILP model finds a lower bound of the MIBLP problem. Using Mc-
Cormick relaxation McCormick (1976), the bilinear terms
∑
k,n:uHk,nµk,ω,sgu,ω,∑
u βu,ω,sgu,ω and
∑
u ϕu,ω,sgu,ω in (14) are replaced by τu,ω,s, τˆu,ω,s and τ¯u,ω,s
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which is bounded through constraints (C.1), (C.2), (C.3), respectively. We
denote
∑
k,n:uHk,nµk,ω,s by µˆu,ω,s in constraints (C.1). This transforms the
MIBLP model into a MILP problem. This MILP problem is solved using ben-
ders decomposition which iterates between a relaxed MILP model (RMILP)
and a LP model (LP1).
Ξµgu,ω +Gu(µˆu,ω,s − Ξµ) ≤ τu,ω,s ≤ Ξµgu,ω, ∀u, ω, s
0 ≤ τu,ω,s ≤ Guµˆu,ω,s, ∀u, ω, s (C.1)
Ξβgu,ω +Gu(βu,ω,s − Ξβ) ≤ τˆu,ω,s ≤ Ξβgu,ω, ∀u, ω, s
0 ≤ τˆu,ω,s ≤ Guβu,ω,s, ∀u, ω, s (C.2)
Ξϕgu,ω +Gu(ϕu,ω,s − Ξϕ) ≤ τ¯u,ω,s ≤ Ξϕgu,ω, ∀u, ω, s
0 ≤ τ¯u,ω,s ≤ Guϕu,ω,s, ∀u, ω, s (C.3)
Appendix C.1.1. LP1 model
By fixing the integer variables the MILP becomes an LP. This LP is
obtained by adding constraint (C.4) to the MILP.
b˜ = b¯ : (δ) (C.4)
Vector b¯=[x¯u,a x¯
up
u,a,ω x¯
dn
u,a,ω] is the given integer decisions and vector b˜=[x˜u,a
x˜upu,a,ω x˜
dn
u,a,ω] includes continuous variables. The objective value of the sub-
problem (Υ) gives the upper bound of the MILP problem. If this problem is
infeasible, the feasibility subproblem is formulated and solved as in Li et al.
(2011).
Appendix C.1.2. LP1-R model
In the real-time pricing approaches 2 and 3, the duality gap (¯ω,s) in the
LP1 model is nonzero. To calculate the minimum ¯ω,s for the LP1 model, the
LP1-R model is solved. To obtain the LP1-R model, constraints (10) and
(13) are removed from the LP1 model and the objective function is changed
to minimize
∑
ω,s ˆω,s. The optimal value of ˆω,s in the LP1-R model is fixed
in the LP1 model.
Appendix C.1.3. RMILP model
Given the Lagrange multipliers for the subproblem in iteration y, δ(y)=[δ
(y)
u,a
δ
up,(y)
u,a,ω δ
dn,(y)
u,a,ω ], we formulate the master problem in (C.5).
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Minimize % (C.5a)
Subject to
% ≥ Υ(e) + δ(e)(b− b¯(e)), ∀e ∈ Ey (C.5b)
0 ≥ Υ(l) + δ(l)(b− b¯(l)), ∀l ∈ Oy (C.5c)∑
r:b=1
b(y)r −
∑
r:b=0
b(y)r ≤|r| − 1, ∀y ∈ Ey ∪Oy (C.5d)∑
r:b=1
b(t)r −
∑
r:b=0
b(t)r ≤|r| − 1, ∀t (C.5e)
% ≥ % (C.5f)
Here vector b=[xu,a x
up
u,a,ω x
dn
u,a,ω] represents the integer decisions. Constraint
(C.5b) is the optimality cut in iteration e and ∀e ∈ Ey. Constraint (C.5c) is
the feasibility cut in iteration l and ∀l ∈ Oy. Constraints (C.5d) and (C.5e)
are the integer cuts which forbids a known integer solution to be considered
again. Constraint (C.5f) models the lower bound of %.
Appendix C.2. BLP model
The BLP model is constructed by fixing the integer variables to a given
value in the MIBLP model. We use the PRD algorithm to compute the -
global solution of the BLP model. The PRD algorithm decomposes the BLP
model into two linear models (LP2 model and LP3 model) and solves them
iteratively.
Appendix C.2.1. LP2 model
To obtain the LP2 model, we fix gu,ω in bilinear terms
∑
k,n:uHk,nµk,ω,sgu,ω,∑
u βu,ω,sgu,ω and
∑
u ϕu,ω,sgu,ω in the BLP model. The objective value of the
LP2 model (Ψ) provides a valid upper bound of the BLP problem. If the
value of gu,ω in iteration M (g¯
(M)
u,ω ) makes the LP2 model infeasible, the fea-
sibility model LP2 is formulated and solved as in Floudas (2000).
Appendix C.2.2. LP2-R model
To calculate the minimum ¯ω,s for the LP2 model, the LP2-R model
is solved. To obtain the LP2-R model, constraints (10) and (13) are re-
moved from the LP2 model and the objective function is changed to mini-
mize
∑
ω,s ˆω,s. The optimal value of ˆω,s in the LP2-R model is fixed in the
LP2 model.
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Appendix C.2.3. LP3 model
The LP3 model finds a lower bound of the BLP problem. In each iteration
of the PRD algorithm a linearized Lagrangian is added to the LP3 model
and the lower bound of the BLP problem is updated. Given the Lagrange
multipliers of LP2 model (vector Θ(M)) and the optimal values of all variables
except the ones in the bilinear terms in LP2 (vector Y(M)), the linearized
Lagrangian is formulated in (C.6a). Vectors µ, β and ϕ denote variables
µk,ω,s, βu,ω,s and ϕu,ω,s, respectively.
L(µ,β,ϕ, gu,ω,Y
(M),Θ(M))|linµ(M),β(M),ϕ(M) =
∑
k,ω,s
h
(M)
k,ω,s(gu,ω)(µ− µ(M))+∑
u,ω,s
hˆ(M)u,ω,s(gu,ω)(β − β(M)) +
∑
u,ω,s
h˜(M)u,ω,s(gu,ω)(ϕ−ϕ(M))+
L(µ(M),β(M),ϕ(M), gu,ω,Y
(M),Θ(M)) (C.6a)
h
(M)
k,ω,s(gu,ω) = ∇µL(µ,β,ϕ, gu,ω,Y(M),Θ(M)) (C.6b)
hˆ(M)u,ω,s(gu,ω) = ∇βL(µ,β,ϕ, gu,ω,Y(M),Θ(M)) (C.6c)
h˜(M)u,ω,s(gu,ω) = ∇ϕL(µ,β,ϕ, gu,ω,Y(M),Θ(M)) (C.6d)
Where L(µ,β,ϕ, gu,ω,Y
(M),Θ(M))|lin
µ(M),β(M),ϕ(M)
is the linearized Lagrangian
around µ(M), β(M) and ϕ(M).The L(µ(M),β(M),ϕ(M), gu,ω,Y
(M),Θ(M)) is the
Lagrangian of LP2 model. The LP3 model is formulated in (C.7).
Minimize ϑ (C.7a)
Subject to
ϑ ≥ L(µB,βB,ϕB, gu,ω,Y(m),Θ(m)|linµ(m),β(m),ϕ(m)
h
(m)
k,ω,s(gu,ω) ≤ 0, if µB = Ξµ
h
(m)
k,ω,s(gu,ω) ≥ 0, if µB = 0
hˆ(m)u,ω,s(gu,ω) ≤ 0, if βB = Ξβ
hˆ(m)u,ω,s(gu,ω) ≥ 0, if βB = 0
h˜(m)u,ω,s(gu,ω) ≤ 0, if ϕB = Ξϕ
h˜(m)u,ω,s(gu,ω) ≥ 0, if ϕB = 0

m = 1, ...,M − 1,
m ∈ V
(C.7b)
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ϑ ≥ L(M)0 (gu,ω,Y(M), Θ(M))− Γh(M)q (gu,ω)
h(M)q (gu,ω) ≥ h(M)k,ω,s(gu,ω)
h(M)q (gu,ω) ≥ −h(M)k,ω,s(gu,ω)
ϑ ≥ L(M)0 (gu,ω,Y(M), Θ(M))− Γˆhˆ(M)qˆ (gu,ω)
hˆ
(M)
qˆ (gu,ω) ≥ hˆ(M)u,ω,s(gu,ω)
hˆ
(M)
qˆ (gu,ω) ≥ −hˆ(M)u,ω,s(gu,ω)
ϑ ≥ L(M)0 (gu,ω,Y(M), Θ(M))− Γˆh˜(M)qˆ (gu,ω)
h˜
(M)
qˆ (gu,ω) ≥ h˜(M)u,ω,s(gu,ω)
h˜
(M)
qˆ (gu,ω) ≥ −h˜(M)u,ω,s(gu,ω)

If M ∈ V
(C.7c)
ϑ ≥ L(M)0 (gu,ω,Y(M), Θ(M)) + Γh(M)q (gu,ω)
h(M)q (gu,ω) ≤ h(M)k,ω,s(gu,ω)
h(M)q (gu,ω) ≤ −h(M)k,ω,s(gu,ω)
ϑ ≥ L(M)0 (gu,ω,Y(M), Θ(M)) + Γˆhˆ(M)qˆ (gu,ω)
hˆ
(M)
qˆ (gu,ω) ≤ hˆ(M)u,ω,s(gu,ω)
hˆ
(M)
qˆ (gu,ω) ≤ −hˆ(M)u,ω,s(gu,ω)
ϑ ≥ L(M)0 (gu,ω,Y(M), Θ(M))Γˆh˜(M)qˆ (gu,ω)
h˜
(M)
qˆ (gu,ω) ≤ h˜(M)u,ω,s(gu,ω)
h˜
(M)
qˆ (gu,ω) ≤ −h˜(M)u,ω,s(gu,ω)

If M ∈ V
(C.7d)
Constraints (11e), (11f), (11g) (C.7e)
Where ϑ is the lower bound of the BLP problem. Term µB, βB and ϕB is
the upper/lower bound of µ, β and ϕ. Indices q ∈ Q and qˆ ∈ Qˆ represent a
subset of (k, ω, s) and (u, ω, s), respectively where q ∈ {(1, 1, 1), ..., (K,Ω, S)}
and qˆ ∈ {(1, 1, 1), ..., (U,Ω, S)}. Term L(M)0 (gu,ω,Y(M),Θ(M)) represents all
the terms in the linearized Lagrange function in iteration M which depends
only on gu,ω. Scalars Γ and Γˆ is the cardinality of sets Q and Qˆ. Inequalities
(C.7b) represent the linearized Lagrange functions from the previous M − 1
iterations. Floudas (2000) shows that the minimum value of ϑ is achieved
at the minimum or maximum value of h
(M)
q (gu,ω), hˆ
(M)
qˆ (gu,ω) and h˜
(M)
qˆ (gu,ω).
Inequalities (C.7c) assume h
(M)
q (gu,ω), hˆ
(M)
qˆ (gu,ω) and h˜
(M)
qˆ (gu,ω) are at its
maximum value and inequalities (C.7d) assume h
(M)
q (gu,ω), hˆ
(M)
qˆ (gu,ω) and
h˜
(M)
qˆ (gu,ω) are at its minimum value. Two subproblems (one assumes h
(M)
q (gu,ω),
hˆ
(M)
qˆ (gu,ω) and h˜
(M)
qˆ (gu,ω) are at their maximum value and the other one as-
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sumes h
(M)
q (gu,ω), hˆ
(M)
qˆ (gu,ω) and h˜
(M)
qˆ (gu,ω) are at their minimum value) are
formulated. Subproblem 1 is formulated by (C.7a), (C.7b), (C.7c) and (C.7e).
Similarly, subproblem 2 is formulated by (C.7a), (C.7b), (C.7d) and (C.7e).
These two subproblems are solved for each u, k, ω, s and the minimum value
of ϑ is the lower bound of the BLP problem. If the LP2 model in iteration
M is infeasible, the Lagrangian from the feasibility model LP2 is formed and
used in the LP3 model, see Floudas (2000).
The steps of the combined NGBD-PRD solution algorithm is detailed in
Steps (0)-(12)
Step 0 Set UB1 and UB2 to +∞ and LB1 to −∞. Set tolerance ε. Set
given integer decisions. Go to Step 1.
Step 1 Go to Step 2, if (LB1 < UB1) and (LB1 < UB2 − ε). Otherwise go
to Step 7.
Step 2 Set y=y+1. Solve the LP1-R model and calculate ˆω,s. Set ¯ω,s=ˆω,s
in the LP1. Solve the LP1 model. Go to Step 3, if it is feasible.
Otherwise go to Step 4.
Step 3 Add an optimality cut to problem (C.5). Add set E(y) = E(y−1)∪{y}.
Update UB1 = min(UB1,Υ). Go to Step 5.
Step 4 Solve the feasibility LP1 model. Add a feasibility cut to problem
(C.5). Add set O(y) = O(y−1) ∪ {y}. Go to Step 5.
Step 5 Solve the RMILP problem in (C.5). Set LB1 = % and store the
solution of (C.5) in b¯(y+1)=b¯∗. Go to Step 6.
Step 6 Go to Step 7, if LB1 ≥ UB1. Otherwise go to Step 2.
Step 7 Terminate if UB1 ≥ UB2. Otherwise go to Step 8.
Step 8 Fix b=b¯(y) and Solve the BLP problem using steps (8-a)-(8-g).
Step 8-a Set UB2 to +∞ and LB2 to −∞. Set g(M)u,ω = g(e)u,ω. Go to
Step 8-b.
Step 8-b Solve the LP2-R model and store ˆω,s. Go to Step 8-c.
Step 8-c Fix ¯ω,s = ˆω,s in LP2 and solve the LP2 model for gu,ω =
g¯
(M)
u,ω . If it is feasible, add M to V . Update UB2 = min(UB2,Ψ).
If the LP2 model is infeasible, add M to Z and solve the feasibility
LP2 model. Go to Step 8-d.
32
Step 8-d Evaluate hmk,ω,s(gu,ω) for all previous M − 1 iterations and
select one Lagrange function for each previous iteration using the
procedure below and go to Step 8-e.
 If h
(m)
k,ω,s(g
(M)
u,ω ) ≥ ε, set µB = 0
 If h
(m)
k,ω,s(g
(M)
u,ω ) ≤ −ε, set µB = Ξµ
 If hˆ
(m)
u,ω,s(g
(M)
u,ω ) ≥ ε, set βB = 0
 If hˆ
(m)
u,ω,s(g
(M)
u,ω ) ≤ −ε, set βB = Ξβ
 If h˜
(m)
u,ω,s(g
(M)
u,ω ) ≥ ε, set ϕB = 0
 If h˜
(m)
u,ω,s(g
(M)
u,ω ) ≤ −ε, set ϕB = Ξϕ
Step 8-e Solve subproblem 1 and subproblem 2 for ∀q ∈ Q and ∀qˆ ∈
Qˆ. If it is feasible, store ϑ and gu,ω. Go to Step 8-f.
Step 8-f Select the minimum value of the stored ϑ and the corre-
sponding gu,ω. Update the lower bound LB2 = ϑ
min and set
g
(M+1)
u,ω = gminu,ω . Go to Step 8-g
Step 8-g Go to Step 9 if UB2 − LB2 < ε. Otherwise go to Step 8-a.
Step 9 Set Rf = Rf−1 ∪ {y}. Update UB2 = min(UB2,Ψ). Go to Step 10.
Step 10 Go to Step 11, if E \ R 6= ∅. Otherwise set UB1 = ∞ and go to
Step 12.
Step 11 Pick v ∈ E(y) \ R(f) such that Υ(v) = minw∈Ey\RfΥw. Update
UB1 = Υ
v. Set b¯(y)=b¯(v) and y = v. Go to Step 12.
Step 12 Terminate if UB1 ≥ UB2 and LB1 ≥ UB2 − ε. Otherwise, go to
Step 1.
The solution algorithm is coded by the authors in GAMS’ platform. LP1,
LP1-R, RMILP, LP2 and LP2-R models are solved by the CPLEX solver,
the LP3 model is solved by the MOSEK solver. The codes are run on a
computer with two CPUs each with 2.30 GHz clocking frequency and 128
GB of RAM.
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Appendix D. The details of replacement of complementary slack-
ness conditions by strong duality conditions
The complementary slackness conditions of (1d-1i) are written in D.1.
µk,ω,s
(
Fk −
∑
n
Hk,n(
∑
n:u
(gu,ω + g
up
u,ω,s − gdnu,ω,s)− vn,ω,s−
Dn,ω + ∆Wn,ω,s)
)
= 0, ∀k, ω, s (D.1a)
κu,ω,sg
up
u,ω,s = 0, ∀u, ω, s (D.1b)
βu,ω,s(Gu − gu,ω − gupu,ω,s) = 0, ∀u, ω, s (D.1c)
ψu,ω,sg
dn
u,ω,s = 0, ∀u, ω, s (D.1d)
ϕu,ω,s(gu,ω − gdnu,ω,s) = 0, ∀u, ω, s (D.1e)
θn,ω,svn,ω,s = 0, ∀n, ω, s (D.1f)
χn,ω,s(W¯n,ω + ∆Wn,ω,s − vn,ω,s) = 0, ∀n, ω, s (D.1g)
We can prove that the strong duality condition in (2e) is the exact re-
formulation of the complementary slackness conditions in (D.1) using the
following the steps below:
Step 1 Multiply both sides of stationary conditions (2a), (2b) and (2c) by
gupu,ω,s, g
dn
u,ω,s and vn,ω,s, respectively. Sum the left-hand sides and obtain
an equality which has a right-hand side value zero.
Step 2 Sum the both sides of all equalities in (D.1) and obtain an equality
which has a right-hand side value zero.
Step 3 Subtract left-hand side of the equality obtained in Step 1 from the
equality obtained in Step 2.
Step 4 From (1e), replace
∑
n:u(g
up
u,ω,s − gdnu,ω,s)− vn,ω,s by Dn,ω −∆Wn,ω,s −∑
n:u gu,ω. The resulting equality is exactly the same with (2e).
Given the day-ahead decisions, Table D.15 shows the nonlinear terms
and the number of constraints in two cases: (a) The KKT condition with
complementary slackness conditions and (b) the KKT conditions with strong
duality condition.
It can be seen from Table D.15 that replacing the complementary slack-
ness conditions by the strong duality conditions reduces the total number
of constraints from (K + 4U + 2N)xΩxS to ΩxS. Moreover the number of
nonlinear terms reduces from (3K + 4U + 2N)xΩxS to zero.
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Table D.15: The nonlinear terms and the number of constraints in Case (a) (KKT con-
ditions with complementary slackness conditions) and in Case (b) (KKT conditions with
strong duality condition), K: Number of transmission lines, U : Number of producers, N :
Number of nodes, Ω, S: Number of imbalance scenarios.
Constraints Nonlinear terms #constraints #nonlinear
terms
Case (a)
(D.1a)
µk,ω,s
∑
nHk,n(
∑
n:u g
up
u,ω,s)
KxΩxS 3xKxΩxSµk,ω,s
∑
nHk,n(
∑
n:u g
dn
u,ω,s)
µk,ω,s
∑
nHk,nvn,ω,s
(D.1b) κu,ω,sg
up
u,ω,s UxΩxS UxΩxS
(D.1c) βu,ω,sg
up
u,ω,s UxΩxS UxΩxS
(D.1d) ψu,ω,sg
dn
u,ω,s UxΩxS UxΩxS
(D.1e) ϕu,ω,sg
dn
u,ω,s UxΩxS UxΩxS
(D.1f) θn,ω,svn,ω,s NxΩxS NxΩxS
(D.1f) χn,ω,svn,ω,s NxΩxS NxΩxS
Case (b) (2e) - ΩxS 0
References
Alaywan, Z., Wu, T., Papalexopoulos, A. D., Oct 2004. Transitioning the
california market from a zonal to a nodal framework: an operational per-
spective. In: IEEE PES Power Systems Conference and Exposition, 2004.
Vol. 2. pp. 862–867.
Bjørndal, E., Bjørndal, M., Gribkovskaia, V., 2012. Congestion management
in the nordic power market: nodal pricing versus zonal pricing. Tech.
Rep. 15, SNF, NHH.
Bjørndal, M., Jo¨rnsten, K., 2007. Benefits from coordinating congestion man-
agementthe nordic power market. Energy Policy 35 (3), 1978 – 1991.
Bjørndal, M., Jo¨rnsten, K., Pignon, V., 2003. Congestion management in
the nordic power market counter purchases and zonal pricing. Journal of
Network Industries os-4 (3), 271–292.
URL https://doi.org/10.1177/178359170300400302
Boyd, S., Vandenberghe, L., 2004. Convex Optimization. Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, New York, NY, USA.
35
Chao, H.-P., Peck, S., Sep 1998. Reliability management in competitive elec-
tricity markets. Journal of Regulatory Economics 14 (2), 189–200.
Costa, A., Liberti, L., 2012. Relaxations of multilinear convex envelopes:
Dual is better than primal. In: Klasing, R. (Ed.), Experimental Algo-
rithms. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, pp. 87–98.
Dijk, J., Willems, B., Mar. 2011. The Effect of Counter-trading on Compe-
tition in Electricity Markets. Energy Policy 39 (3), 1764–1773.
Floudas, C. A., 2000. The gop primal–relaxed dual decomposition approach:
theory. In: Deterministic Global Optimization: Theory, Methods and Ap-
plications. Vol. 37. Springer US, Boston, MA, pp. 67–139.
Fuller, J. D., Celebi, E., 2017. Alternative models for markets with noncon-
vexities. European Journal of Operational Research 261 (2), 436 – 449.
Gabriel, S., Conejo, A., Fuller, J., Hobbs, B., Ruiz, C., 2012. Complemen-
tarity Modeling in Energy Markets. International Series in Operations Re-
search & Management Science. Springer New York.
Gabriel, S. A., Sep 2017. Solving discretely constrained mixed complemen-
tarity problems using a median function. Optimization and Engineering
18 (3), 631–658.
URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11081-016-9341-2
Gabriel, S. A., Conejo, A. J., Ruiz, C., Siddiqui, S., 2013a. Solving discretely
constrained, mixed linear complementarity problems with applications in
energy. Computers and Operations Research 40 (5), 1339 – 1350.
Gabriel, S. A., Siddiqui, S. A., Conejo, A. J., Ruiz, C., Sep 2013b. Solving
discretely-constrained nash–cournot games with an application to power
markets. Networks and Spatial Economics 13 (3), 307–326.
URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11067-012-9182-2
Green, R., 2007. Nodal pricing of electricity: how much does it cost to get it
wrong? Journal of Regulatory Economics 31 (2), 125–149.
Grigg, C., Wong, P., Albrecht, P., Allan, R., Bhavaraju, M., Billinton, R.,
Chen, Q., Fong, C., Haddad, S., Kuruganty, S., Li, W., Mukerji, R., Pat-
ton, D., Rau, N., Reppen, D., Schneider, A., Shahidehpour, M., Singh, C.,
36
Aug 1999. The ieee reliability test system-1996. a report prepared by the
reliability test system task force of the application of probability methods
subcommittee. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems 14 (3), 1010–1020.
Gupta, A., Jain, R., Poolla, K., Varaiya, P., Dec 2015. Equilibria in two-stage
electricity markets. In: Proc. 2015 54th IEEE Conference on Decision and
Control (CDC). pp. 5833–5838.
Gupte, A., Ahmed, S., Cheon, M. S., Dey, S., 2013. Solving mixed integer
bilinear problems using milp formulations. SIAM Journal on Optimization
23 (2), 721–744.
Harvey, S. M., Hogan, W. W., 2000a. Nodal and Zonal Congestion
Management and the Exercise of Market Power. Harvard University,
http://ksghome. harvard. edu/˜. whogan. cbg. ksg.
Harvey, S. M., Hogan, W. W., 2000b. Nodal and Zonal Congestion Man-
agement and the Exercise of Market Power: Further Comments. Harvard
University, http://ksghome. harvard. edu/˜. whogan. cbg. ksg 11.
Hesamzadeh, M. R., Biggar, D. R., Aug 2012. Computation of extremal-nash
equilibria in a wholesale power market using a single-stage MILP. Power
Systems, IEEE Transactions on 27 (3), 1706–1707.
Hesamzadeh, M. R., Biggar, D. R., May 2013. Merger analysis in wholesale
power markets using the equilibria-band methodology. IEEE Transactions
on Power Systems 28 (2), 819–827.
Holmberg, P., Lazarczyk, E., 2015. Congestion Management in Electric-
ity Networks: Nodal, Zonal and Discriminatory Pricing. Energy Journal
36 (2), 145 – 166.
Hu, X., Ralph, D., Oct 2007. Using epecs to model bilevel games in restruc-
tured electricity markets with locational prices. Operations research 55 (5),
809–827.
Huppmann, D., Siddiqui, S., 2018. An exact solution method for binary equi-
librium problems with compensation and the power market uplift problem.
European Journal of Operational Research 266 (2), 622 – 638.
37
Li, X., Tomasgard, A., Barton, P. I., Dec 2011. Nonconvex generalized ben-
ders decomposition for stochastic separable mixed-integer nonlinear pro-
grams. Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 151 (3), 425.
McCormick, G. P., 1976. Computability of global solutions to factorable non-
convex programs: Part i — convex underestimating problems. Mathemat-
ical Programming 10 (1), 147–175.
Neuhoff, K., Hobbs, B., Newbery, D. M., 2011. Congestion management in
european power networks: Criteria to assess the available options. Dis-
cussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1161, DIW Berlin, German Institute for
Economic Research.
URL https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp1161
Ruderer, D., Zo¨ttl, G., 2012. The impact of transmission pricing in network
industries. Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1230, Faculty of Eco-
nomics, University of Cambridge.
URL https://ideas.repec.org/p/cam/camdae/1230.html
Ruiz, C., Conejo, A. J., Gabriel, S. A., Aug 2012. Pricing non-convexities
in an electricity pool. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems 27 (3), 1334–
1342.
Stoft, S., 1999. Financial transmission rights meet cournot: How tccs curb
market power. The Energy Journal 20 (1), 1–23.
Tawarmalani, M., Sahinidis, N. V., June 2005. A polyhedral branch-and-
cut approach to global optimization. Mathematical Programming 103 (2),
225–249.
Van den Bergh, K., Boury, J., Delarue, E., 2016. The flow-based market cou-
pling in central western europe: Concepts and definitions. The Electricity
Journal 29 (1), 24 – 29.
Willems, B., 2002. Modeling cournot competition in an electricity market
with transmission constraints. The Energy Journal 23 (3), 95–125.
Zhang, D., Kim, S., June 2010. A two stage stochastic equilibrium model
for electricity markets with forward contracts. In: Proc. 2010 11th Inter-
national Conference on Probabilistic Methods Applied to Power Systems
(PMAPS). pp. 194–199.
38
Zhang, D., Xu, H., Dec 2013. Two-stage stochastic equilibrium problems with
equilibrium constraints: modeling and numerical schemes. Optimization
62 (12), 1627–1650.
Zhang, D., Xu, H., Wu, Y., Feb 2010. A two stage stochastic equilibrium
model for electricity markets with two way contracts. Mathematical Meth-
ods of Operations Research 71 (1), 1–45.
39
